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Summary
We suppose that civilians under threat prefer certain situations within a context of
irregular war and endangered survival; they will prefer those situations associated with
greater probabilities of survival. Using lexicographical preferences and belief systems,
we have shown that civilians will choose not to remain in situations having a lower
probability of survival. Linking into social networks allows for shorter deliberation
processes, lower decision costs and faster convergence towards collective decision-making.
Civilian displacement thus becomes the outcome of a rational decision-making procedure.
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7th October 2002 and approved on 4 th April 2003.Certain basic theories have established by diverse means that war is fundamentally
irrational. Agents who prefer using violence and war to institutional means in
order to achieve their objectives are presumed irrational. It is also true that the
use of violence offers no demonstrable benefits for the human species as a
whole [Sampson 2001]; or at least in the long-term, not for the agents involved.
In the context of the Colombian conflict, Cubides, Ortiz and Olaya define the
irrationality of violence in the following terms:
…the study of the logic behind the actions of social and individual actors, leads to a
similar conclusion: the violence, the levels of irrationality which conflicts tend to deal
in, is determined by the little value that is assigned to the institutional means created
to resolve them [Cubides et al. 1998: 244].
This essay proposes, however, that it is possible to make a direct connection
between war and rationality. To this end we will refer to the case of the irregular
war that is being waged in Colombia today. We do not intend to prove the truth
of statements such as, “war is rational” or “the irregular war in Colombia is
rational”. In this essay, the term rational is not considered to be an adjective nor
attribute of war in general, or of any specific armed conflict. War per se is neither
rational nor irrational, but rather those who participate in it, those who propitiate
it, who coexist with war, who continue to prefer war to other alternatives in any
given situation of conflict. Neither do we intend to establish the just or unjust
character of war. We assume that the irregular war in Colombia is a specific
situation in which the different agents involved –armed factions, civilians, the
State– have to selected strategies designed to achieve certain fundamental aims.
The main point in our line of reasoning is that the agents involved in this violent
conflict adopt strategies that can be considered as rational within the existing
institutional, historical, geographical, and information restrictions.
In order to determine more exactly the problem we wish to analyse here, we are
only going to consider the behaviour of the civilian population within the context
of the Colombian armed conflict. We are interested in understanding the
rationality of individual and collective actions in a situation of irregular war. We
base our reasoning on the concept of rationality as found in economic theory18 / Colombian Economic Journal, Vol. 1, N°  1, 2003
and Game Theory. In Ulysses and the Sirens, John Elster [1979/1984] proposes
that rational choice is the result of a process made up of two steps:
To explain why a person in a given situation behaves in one way rather than in another,
we can see his action as the result of two successive filtering processes. The first has
the effect of limiting the set of abstractly possible actions to the feasible set, i.e. the
set of actions that satisfy simultaneously a number of physical, technical, economic
and politico-legal constraints. The second has the effect of singling out one member
of the feasible set as the action which is to be carried out [1979/1984: 76].
This definition is compatible with the common use of rationality in microeconomics
and in Game Theory. The first step of the filtering process implies interpreting
rational action in a way that is compatible with the existence of different possible
worlds, and with the introduction of explanations not dependent on the successful
resolution of the optimisation problem relative to the situation in question. However,
the second step brings us back to the rationality that is characteristic of economic
theory: rational agents, in normal conditions of computation and inference, must
be able to choose a single element from the range of attainable alternatives. We
will begin by discussing the second step.
When selecting an element that guarantees a function’s optimisation, be it in
terms of utility or profits, the agent must have a complete and consistent order
of preferences regarding the attainable alternatives. According to Little [1992:
3], the pertinent question in this type of interpretation is: “how should the agent
act given this range of preferences?” The decisive intervention of Elster gives
rise to a different question: how should the agent act if the range of preferences
is not fixed and it changes endogenously in response to changes in the situation
at hand? It is in this new context that we intend to discuss the rationality typical
of agents in the civilian population, within the context of irregular war.
The problem that the population must solve, in a context such as that mentioned
above, can be defined thus: what is the best course of action in a situation that
poses an increasing threat to survival due to the violent actions of armed
organisations? We are assuming that the population has not made ideologically
clear choices; that they do not identify, in ideological or political terms, with any
of the armed organisations or coalitions vying to control the territory and its
population. Obviously, this is not always the case. However, it is true that in the
Colombian situation, the degree of ideological or political identification that the
population feels for one or other of the armed factions is very small. Indeed, itRationality, preferences and irregular war  / 19
becomes almost insignificant within the context that we are considering. In the
language of Elster [1997], we would be ruling out one of the possible ‘I’ of the
civilian agents, or better still, we would be applying a flexible, even opportunistic,
interpretation of the political and ideological ‘I’ of civilian agents.
This stance is not arbitrary. In a war, civilians learn from experience. It is almost
natural to consider their learning processes in a sequential way. When a war
begins, economic opportunities and gains are important. It is even very likely
that agents located in war zones, with higher economic opportunities, offer loyalty
in exchange for protection and might very well identify themselves with one
armed organisation or another. But war is a hard master. Agents learn that in
disputed territories there is no such thing as full protection. The need to enforce
the monopoly of violence and control leads to the use of violence. It might be
discriminate or indiscriminate, random or deliberate, arbitrary or modulated. In
any case agents learn that nobody living in disputed territories can escape the
reach of violence. Kalyvas words it out in a precise way:
Although material and non-material benefits matter in initial stages of the war, once
violence escalates into the ‘main game in town’, individual survival becomes the main
priority for most people irrespective of their political preferences. Most civilians will
come to increasingly value their own survival and this consideration will weigh on the choices
they will make [Kalyvas 2001: 6, our emphasis].
To respond to the question raised above, we need to define the set of opportunities
or alternatives facing civilian agents, as well as their preferences. However which
domain should be used to define the order of preferences: all the possible results
of the agents’ actions, and their interaction with the actions of the armed
organisations? No. In reality agents, according to their perceptions, order their
preferences in relation to existing, potential situations. In other words, they order
their preferences according to the existing opportunities within each one. Here,
obviously, various differences emerge with regard to the traditional stance on
rationality. The first difference is that these preferences do not have the same
domain as in conventional theory. Given the uncertainty of the result of the
individuals’ actions and of their interaction with the actions of the armed
organisations, it would be very costly, almost impossible, to generate preferences
based on these results. For this reason, the preferences operate on existing
situations according to the perception of each of the agents.
How are these perceptions developed? In schematic terms, we can say that they
are generated by personal, prior experiences, by the evaluation of the results of20 / Colombian Economic Journal, Vol. 1, N°  1, 2003
past actions, by historical circumstances, and by social interaction with other
individuals, networks, groups and organisations. Who is the agent that builds these
perceptions? It is not the individual agent of conventional economic rationality. It
is true that by looking at individual actions, we can understand the result of social
interactions, but, due to the high cost of deliberation, a lone could not generate
the perceptions necessary to construct an order of preferences and take the
corresponding decisions. Instead, we propose that these perceptions are developed
via social interaction; and that the individual then acts on them. It is an individual
who decides to flee his or her land for fear of reprisal from an armed organisation,
but it is interaction with other individuals, groups, organisations and social networks,
that allows the individual to reduce the amount of deliberation necessary in order
to arrive at a defined perception of the situation at hand.
In a first instance, individuals will prefer one situation to another if the economic
opportunities are greater than those to be gained from the second situation.
This criterion is compatible with that of the theory of utility: one situation is
preferred to another if, and only if, the economic utility derived from it is greater
than that obtainable from the second situation. However, there is a second
criterion that reflects the type of choice an agent needs to make in a situation of
irregular war: one situation is chosen over another if, and only if, it represents
better economic opportunities and if the probability of survival is greater than a
certain threshold pu. In more formal terms: if x and y are situations perceived by
an individual i in a context of irregular war, then,
x fi y  ￿ u(x) > u(y) and px
s > pu ,  ps, pu ˛ [0,1]
Evidently, the problem that the individual needs to resolve in this situation is
more complicated than the typical optimisation problem as defined by
conventional theory. Here, the agent must correctly and simultaneously evaluate
the economic opportunities and the probability of survival associated with a
given situation, in a certain territory and at a particular moment in time. What is
the basis of this evaluation? We have already mentioned their past life story and
information available at the time about previous experiences in other territories.
But this is not enough. An example would be appropriate. A situation in which
agents are completely unsure of the outcome of the dispute between two armed
factions, in which there is no indication as to which of the two factions will
prevail in the near future, or in which the change in domination is perceived to
be traumatic and violent, will lead to the perception of the probability of survivalRationality, preferences and irregular war  / 21
being close to zero and result in the choice of action being to flee the territory in
question.
On the other hand, the existence of a large coalition within a territory will
guarantee the stable domination of that alliance and increase the probability of
survival in that region. The appropriate action therefore will be to remain in that
territory, ensure the power of the existing coalition and enjoy the economic
opportunities in place. From the formal and descriptive perspective, however,
this gives rise to an obvious difficulty: how to fix the minimum threshold of
survival? By which process does a community, a group of individuals and social
networks perceive that they are dangerously close to the survival threshold and
that they should abandon the area? One way of broaching the problem is to
postulate the existence of social processes that, through imitation and contagion,
lead individuals to opt for a single alternative. Formalising of this kind of
alternative is not easy and requires starting from local interaction [Morris 2000,
Chwe 2000] in order to converge on, under certain circumstances, global results.
There is, however, an additional problem: those territories in which there are
greater economic opportunities are the same territories where the armed factions
prefer to base themselves. As such, the two variables are not independent.
Relocation to areas with economic opportunities greater than those available in
other places, goes hand in hand with the decrease in the probability of survival
for individuals who have decided to settle in those regions. The set that represents
the situation of individuals located in territories with greater economic
opportunities is enlarged by the addition of a new element: a probability of
survival that decreases over time and which reaches levels lower than those of
the established, minimum threshold. It is the introduction of this new element
that leads individuals to exercise what we could interpret as a form of self-control.
Once the probability of survival is less than, or close to, the minimum threshold,
individuals prefer to abandon a situation of danger, even if this means they have
to accept inferior economic arrangements. Note, however, that the final result
also depends on the early interactions and the decisions of the civilian population
at the outset of the threat.
However, another analytical question remains: what is the rational bridge between
the new order of preferences and the probability of survival? Here we propose
a system that represents the beliefs of each agent i with respect to the beliefs of
other agents (agent -i, his or her neighbour, for instance) with respect to the
most probable action of the armed agent j. A new question emerges: how to22 / Colombian Economic Journal, Vol. 1, N°  1, 2003
change the order of preferences fi so that i can choose the most adequate action,
given the belief system of i and -i? Now everything revolves around the agents’
belief system and the specific conditions for the epistemic interaction between
civil and armed agents. Note that civilian agents’ location used to depend
exclusively on the economic opportunities available to them, but not any more.
Agents’ decisions now depend on that element and on the probability of survival,
ps ˛ [0, 1]. And ps depends on the civilian agents’ belief system.
Let’s imagine that a rival armed organisation has threatened to dispute control
of a territory in which a group of civilians live. It makes no difference if the
information has been delivered via rumours or direct threats. The fact is that the
set of situations on which they have to establish their preferences has changed.
If an armed agent j threatens to dispute a territory, situation x becomes, in the
context of the belief system, a potential state y, clearly inferior to x in economic




Remember that individuals located in an undisputed territory rank x over all
other situations. That is, they prefer x over all other states potentially available to
them at time t. Thus a dramatic transformation occurs. As we said before, the
territory they live in becomes an object of dispute. How would individuals choose
now? The first impact would be on their perceptions. As the perceived probability
of survival decreases, situation x is no longer the same. Even if economic
opportunities remained equal, a decreasing probability of survival would change
one of the elements of the set that represents situation x. If x is no longer the
same situation x, by what means would individuals choose an alternative in this
new context? Individuals can introduce a new situation y to describe the fact that
the original situation is deteriorating rapidly. Now they have to choose between
a past situation that is deteriorating and a new, darker situation emerging before
their eyes. The new, lexicographic1, preferences could be written down as:
{x’} fi {x’, y}fi {y}
1 A formal and intuitive definition of lexicographic preferences can be found in Mas-Collel et
al. [1995: 46]. “Define x f y if either “x1> y1” or “x1 = y1 and x2> y2”. This is known as the
lexicographic preference relation. The name derives from the way a dictionary is organized; that is,
commodity 1 has the highest priority in determining the preference ordering, just as the first
letter of a word does in the ordering of a dictionary”. Within the context of irregular war,
probability of survival has the highest priority in determining the preference ordering between
situations.Rationality, preferences and irregular war  / 23
Note that situation x has been replaced by x’2. The reason is straightforward:
individuals cannot prefer situation x anymore because it is fading away. Now they
have to choose a situation x’as close as possible in economic terms to x, but with
a higher ps. Individuals, of course, prefer any situation that offers a higher probability
of survival and no territorial disputes. But if a territorial dispute erupts individuals
prefer to choose between x’ and y to stay in situation y, and do not dream of x
anymore. As the probability of survival declines in y, and x is fading away, individuals
choose not to stay in the disputed territory. Their new arrangements are always
inferior in economic and social terms, but it is their only way to improve the odds
of survival. It is important to note that improving chances of survival is not
equivalent to maximising behaviour. As a matter of fact, the new situation x’, in
which agents have a larger probability of survival, is associated with poorer economic
outcomes. Survival has economic and social costs.
The probability of survival within a given territory will be situated above the
minimum threshold if and when an armed agent, or a coalition of armed agents
and the civilian population exercise credible control over that territory. In other
words, for as long as they can effectively exclude any offensive action by a rival
armed organisation. However, this degree of control, in turn, depends on the
choices of the civilian population (Who do they support? Via which networks?
On the basis of which concrete history of relations with the armed agents?3). In
general, peoples’ preferences are not independent of their actions, which, in
turn, depend on the actions of other individuals and their interaction with the
armed agents and, as such, on the perceived results.
The whole process can be described as follows: the agents’ perceptions of the
situation are ‘sent’ to the set survival probabilities. Each perception has one and
only one corresponding probability of survival, but the number of situations to
be evaluated cannot be too many. Indeed, there are few situations or only one
for each moment. The probability of survival associated with this situation leads,
2 We are following here ideas introduced by Gul and Pesendorfer [2000] in an unpublished
paper.
3 The so-called civil resistance has its origin in the different ways in which the civilian population
has interacted with the different armed factions in different regions of the country. The case
of Cauca is very different to that of Caquetá or Huila. In the first, indigenous organisations
have always maintained a fierce independence in relation to the armed factions. This has not
been the case in the other two regions, where relations with the FARC, for example, have been
far reaching and close.24 / Colombian Economic Journal, Vol. 1, N°  1, 2003
in turn, to a single, corresponding action: to remain in or abandon the territory
–in the context of our problem. It is clear that civilian agents prefer situations
with a high probability of survival, and that as far as possible they will strive to
achieve this even if it means incurring very high social and economic costs.
Their preferences have become lexicographic: in situations of increasing danger
for survival, they always prefer a situation with a higher probability of survival.
This can be translated into the language of possible worlds: agents have
perceptions about different possible worlds. In one possible world, there is no
such thing as stable authority, and uncertainty prevails. In another, a large coalition
ensures stable authority, which reduces levels of uncertainty and increases the
time available to make decisions.
The belief system associated with civilian behaviour in disputed territories may be
explicitly represented as follows. Let j be a proposition stating the following: “armed
organisation  j  will exert violence on the civilian population of a specific territory
T”. Proposition j can also be interpreted as the event “armed organisation j exerts
violence on the civilian population at territory T”. In both interpretations civilians
must have beliefs about the potential actions of the incoming armed organisation.
B is a belief operator describing the agents’ beliefs with respect to each other and
the armed agents’ actions. We can thus state:
Bi B-i j (p > 0.5) ﬁ ps < 0.5
Which means that if agent i believes that agent -i believes, with a probability
larger than 0.5, that j is true, then the probability of survival if they stay in the
same territory is less than 0.5. The agents may enlarge this belief system with
new conjecture or rationale about each other’s beliefs. For instance,
B-i Bi B-i j (p > 0.5) ﬁ ps < 0.5
Bi B-i Bi j (p > 0.5) ﬁ  ps < 0.5
B-i Bi B-i j (p = 1) ﬁ ps = 0
Bi B-i Bi  j (p = 1) ﬁ ps = 0
In the same way we can describe other potential states of the belief system and
their associated probabilities of survival:
B-i Bi B-i ￿j (p = 1) ﬁ ps = 1
Bi B-i Bi  ￿j (p = 1)  ﬁ ps = 1Rationality, preferences and irregular war  / 25
B-i Bi B-i j (p = 0.5) ﬁ ps = 0.5
Bi  B-i Bi  j (p = 0.5)  ﬁ ps = 0.5
The first two instances of the belief system describe a situation perceived by the
agents as seriously damaging to their survival. They will prefer not to remain in
that territory and to move to another location x’. The next two describe the
opposite situation: an extremely safe, undisputed territory controlled by an armed
organisation, or coalition, and the civilian population, which leads to a shared
belief of probability of survival close to one. In such a situation it is rational to
believe that no armed agent will try to dispute the territory the civilian agents are
located in. The final two describe a situation of extreme uncertainty: given the
information available, there is no way to rationally establish if j true or false.
This is a dividing point: if the agents’ belief system cannot assign a probability
smaller or larger than 0.5 then agents should prefer not to stay in that territory.
Morris and Shin [1997] and Kajii and Morris [1995], have developed the concept
of p-belief common knowledge. An event is a common p-belief if everyone
believes in it with a probability of at least p, and everyone believes with probability
at least p that everyone believes in it with probability at least p, and so on. We can
translate the results of our belief system into the language of Morris and his
associates: the probability of survival, ps, is a common p-belief at state x if, and
only if, x is an element of a p-evident event j, with the property that everyone
believes ps  is at least p whenever j is true.
From a civilian point of view we can say: whenever everyone believes that j is
true  –or is not true–, everyone believes that everyone believes that ps is at least
p at situation x if, and only if, x is an element of a p-evident event j. But the truth
of j is probabilistic: the armed organisation may attack with a probability close
to one, with zero probability, or with a probability around 0.5. The belief system
then relates each of these probabilities to the probability of survival. Depending
upon the probability given to violence, individuals create a p-belief with respect
to probability of survival. The analytical effects of the two extreme values are
easy to grasp. If the probability of violence is close to one, individuals believe
that the armed organisation will exert violence upon them at any moment, making
their probability of survival fall to near zero. But if they associate a probability
close to zero with the use of violence by that organisation, they will have a
probability of survival close to one.26 / Colombian Economic Journal, Vol. 1, N°  1, 2003
What about a probability of around 0.5? If the probability of survival is bounded
from above, and individuals have lexicographic preferences, it is more likely that
a probability of violence of around 0.5 is translated as a probability of survival
under or close to the survival threshold. In other words, whenever the probability
of violence in a disputed territory is around 0.5, social processes will ring the
survival alarm and the perceived probability of survival will fall towards the survival
threshold. Populations that have suffered several rounds of violence will have
lower survival thresholds: a positive probability of violence will become a survival
threshold of near zero. Both the probability of survival and the survival threshold
will converge towards zero.
In a situation of irregular war there is an element that prevents uncertainty from
decreasing below a certain threshold. The degree of random violence perpetrated
by armed factions –massacres make up a part of this arbitrariness. Each faction
has to prove that it is capable of using violent means to impose its authority,
even at the expense of emptying territories. In a situation of this type it is almost
impossible to obtain enough information to make the correct decision. Referring
to the amount of information required to make a rational decision, Elster phrases
the problem thus:
More generally, we must require not only that beliefs be rational with respect to the
available evidence, but also that the amount of evidence collected be in some sense
optimum. On one hand, there is a risk of collecting too little evidence […] On the
other hand, there is the risk of collecting too much evidence […] Other things being
equal, a decision is likely to better the more evidence we gather and the longer we
deliberate, but other things are not always equal. By the time they have reached a
decision, the occasion may well have passed us by. The patient may be dead, the firm
gone into bankruptcy or the battle lost [Elster 1989: 25].
In analytical terms, we propose the following formula: a situation is defined by a
set of elements made out of the economic opportunities available and the
perceived probability of survival. In normal conditions, an individual’s preferences
will be defined only by the differences in the economic opportunities. In a context
of irregular war, this set, which represents the situation, has an additional element:
the probability of survival. This normally varies between zero and one. However,
a climate of permanent uncertainty generates an upper bound for the probability
of survival. In such a situation lexicographic preferences take over: agents rank
situations and territories based on probability of survival. It does not matter that
huge or relatively large economic opportunities have to be overlooked. Survival
prevails and agents act in a way compatible with that goal. The agents’ perceptionsRationality, preferences and irregular war  / 27
of the situation are associated with a specific probability of survival. But if there
are many individuals facing the same situation, how is it possible to converge on
a single probability of survival and, consequently, a single action? The role of
social interaction through networks and social groups is decisive at this point.
This brings us to the second difference with conventional economic rationality.
The states that come about as a result of the interaction between armed agents
and civilians are emergent states. They arise, not from the direct election of the
agents involved, but from the interaction between them and the constant revision
of their expectations. To understand them, it is necessary to understand the
spontaneous social processes that lead to one result or another and the structures
that are maintained or transformed by these processes. In particular, it is necessary
to understand the processes of the formation, destruction and transformation
of social networks.
The third difference relates to the role of time in civilian decision-making
processes. In an irregular war the risk and the probability of not surviving increase
if no agent or coalition of agents has credible and stable control of the territory.
Moreover, the relevant time for making a survival decision is cut short. It is no
longer a question of making long or middle-term decisions about the level of
security in a certain territory. It is necessary to detect, in a very short space of
time and sometimes immediately, the magnitude of the threat and the degree of
uncertainty inherent in the changing situation. The long-term disappears and
only the short-term is relevant for the purposes of making decisions that lead to
a certain kind of equilibrium;  to stay or not stay in a certain territory, for example.
The perception of time undergoes a crucial change: each moment may be decisive
and the individuals’ survival will depend on the networks they are linked to and
their past actions.
What is known as temporal inconsistency [Rabin 1998, Gul and Pesendorfer
2000] makes an appearance here in another guise4. In situations of irregular war,
the crucial point is not so much the effect of time on agents’ rationality. Nor is
it about the necessary apparition of inconsistency in the individuals’ processes
due to the temptation exerted, on future occasions, by inferior alternatives. The
fact is that agents know that the situation they are in could become even more
uncertain and that today’s preferences may not work tomorrow. However, that
4 In formal terms, however, the question that we raise here can be modelled by following the
formal and rigorous treatment that Gul and Pesendorfer give it in their article [2000].28 / Colombian Economic Journal, Vol. 1, N°  1, 2003
‘tomorrow’ may be very near. The situation can change in a very short period of
time –from one day to another, in a matter of hours– and this places heavy
demands on the rationality of civilian agents. When a threatening future looms,
individuals tend to prefer safer, less risky situations, even though the economic
outcomes associated with them are clearly inferior to those of an uncertain future.
Thus, the future is more heavily discounted and a reversal in preferences comes
about. We are faced not so much with the effect of time on individual preferences
and decisions, as with the imminent probability of a catastrophic event.
The issue here is not that temptation may affect the agents at a later stage, making
them deviate from their long-term plans, but rather the decision of life or death
that they are obliged to make with a minimum amount of deliberation. Note
that the pressure of minimising the cost of deliberation becomes ever stronger
in this type of situation. The crucial role of social networks, groups and civilian
organisations is obvious: it is only through networks that process the relevant
information at the necessary speed that agents can minimise the cost of
deliberation and reach the correct survival decisions in the time available.
The rationality of individuals within a network
The act of forming a network determines the result of individuals interactions
with other organisations. By their very nature, the presence of violent factions
and their constant confrontation with the State military has succeeded in changing
the set of alternatives available to individuals of all social classes throughout the
nation. It is not possible, therefore, to analyse the Colombian situation from the
point of view of isolated agents who make decisions freely or following processes
of conventional deliberation or maximisation.
As we mentioned earlier, the restrictions faced by individuals in a conflict situation
are so strong that the set of alternatives collapses into a set of opportunities
made up of very few elements. This transformation is not casual. As Elster
[1989] states, changing circumstances or opportunities is easier than changing
opinions. The population is aware that ever changing opportunities is a strategy
used by armed factions to achieve their aims. The population must find a
mechanism that allows interaction with these armed organisations at the lowest
possible cost. On the basis of other populations’ experiences in similar
circumstances, civilians learn to recognise that the isolated confrontation of each
individual with an armed agent implies a very high cost.Rationality, preferences and irregular war  / 29
The transformation and decrease in the range of opportunities available to the
population and their constant (obligatory) participation in the Colombian irregular
war has led to the emergence, and use, of civilian networks and organisations in
the regions of greatest conflict. Networks are a representation of relationships
between individuals involved in social or economic activities. When people are
faced with a conflict situation they choose to form networks. The presence of
links represents closeness between individuals that have apparently little in
common. When two individuals have some type of connection, transmission of
information across their links is less costly for them.
Let’s imagine a situation where political actors use violence to try to take control
of people living under enemy control. A certain degree of interaction between
the civil population and the insurgent faction follows. As we have seen, certain
patterns can be observed in the actions of insurgent agents; they form rational
beliefs depending on their exchanges with civil population. Their predatory
activities are neither a threat for the viability of the whole economy nor for its
social tissue. However, if they use terror as a weapon against civilian population
the whole social structure changes –civilians are required to respond to the violent
activity of armed groups. There are several ways to represent such responses.
Networks are one of them. The coming together of individual agents into
networks and groups plays an important part in determining the outcome of
social interactions in the Colombian irregular war; for example in territories where
there is tension between armed groups and where the population must choose a
course of action that involves walking the thin line between life and death. In
these situations, network structures represent different patterns of communication
and cooperation between civilians.
What is the mechanism of network formation? Over time, a group of
unconnected self-interested agents decide whether or not to form links with
each other. Such decisions are based upon other populations’ experiences. Each
agent has some information about the consequences of determined actions,
which they transmit through their connections. Within a network, every
individual is assumed to be symmetrically informed; i.e. individuals who are
linked share information about the environmental in which they live. Each
agent is myopic, and so he/she decides about links based on whether severing
or forming a link will increase or decrease his/her payoff in the current period.
Payoffs thus depend on the individual agent’s perceptions about the state of
the war and its effects upon his/her survival. When we assume that agents are
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are connected. If an agent knows the consequences of another’s actions in
similar circumstances, he/she can process and transform this information into
patterns that allows him/her to make a “correct” decision that decreases the
probability of loss.
Are these social networks the most efficient way to produce, exchange and process
information within a context of irregular war? We believe so. Their significance
lies beyond the fact that they allow information to be exchanged. They are
characterised by two fundamental virtues: the flexibility of links between
individuals (these links can be broken or created at any time, according to the
circumstances or the interests of the network’s members) and the minimum
cost with which they manage to process the available information and take the
corresponding decisions in a situation of irregular war.
The sheer length of the Colombian conflict makes the flexibility of links an
important factor in explaining the different states of interaction between civilians
and armed organisations. A regional overview of our conflict’s evolution shows
the different arrangements achieved by interaction between armed agents and
the civilian population. In the long-run, decisions about adding or severing links
will prove a very important factor to understand why different states come about
as an outcome of the strategic interaction between civilians and armed
organisations. A regional overview of our conflict’s evolution shows a wide range
of arrangements achieved by the interaction of armed agents and civilian
population. We can find places where social networks have accelerated people
displacement, increasing their probability of survival and contributing to the
overthrow of one of the parties’ territorial control. In other places, social networks
have promoted civilian resistance against armed agents’ claims. A failure to
construct social networks may help to understand the massive killings of civilians
in other places and circumstances.
The efficiency of links depends upon players’ location. We argue that the
formation of networks within a context of irregular war is related to the spatial
distance between individuals. It means that networks are formed between
members that are spatially close or connected through friendship or kinship ties.
It is easy to verify that the population of the Northern region of the country
does not form links with the Southern population because of the huge geographic
distance between them. This gives a geographic flavour to social networks analysis,
and yields some interesting structures for efficient networks. Thus, we analyse
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same type of violence. It is possible that the only existence of this condition
leads to the formation or activation of networks.
Within a territory T individuals linked by ties of family, kinship or friendship
must take a decision with respect to stay in or moving out of it. Those who
choose to move out have to take another crucial decision: which place they will
locate in. The set of available locations is of course very large, but some minimal
rationality criteria will make it shrink to a more manageable size. Individuals will
prefer locations that (i) minimise the distance with respect to their former location;
(ii) minimise the economic and social loss from being displaced; (iii) have a higher
perceived probability of survival. How can they gather the information required
to comply with the above criteria? Social networks are crucial here. Family
members, acquaintances, friends already located in other places, or that have
experienced displacement on an earlier moment, can send messages or signals
about the outcomes of their own decisions in the past. Information about better
living conditions, more proactive authorities, more active independent aid
organisations, local population more open to the influx of displaced people can
be transferred through dormant but now activated networks. It is the perception
of a new state of the world which prompts the activation of social networks and
decreases the probability of error in displaced people’s decisions. The impact of
networks is deeper and more continuous in communities with a more knit-tight
social tissue, stronger societal links and a higher degree of independence with
respect to the armed organisations’ demands. In Cauca and Chocó, the Indian
and Black communities have been able of preserving their social links, keep their
independence from armed organisations’ pressures and move within their
territories without losing their basic social structures.
In Colombia, some guerrilla and paramilitary groups view the civilian population
as a tool they may use to achieve their objectives. If one of these groups needs
to recover a territory from the hands of the enemy, it often targets the civilian
population through selective murders and massacres. However, if it requires the
support or loyalty of civilians, the group becomes a protection agency or, in
some situations, assumes state functions. As Kalyvas point out:
Political actors may intend to govern the people against whom they are using violence,
or they may not. In the second case, the purpose of violence is exhausted by its use,
whereas in the first, it lies in the purposive creation of fear: violence is a means, not an
end; a resource, not the final product. Violence is, then, a tool for shaping individual
behaviour by attaching a cost to particular actions. This is often called “terror” [Kalyvas
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At this moment the population must take decisions. If taken separately, the cost
of a mistake in survival terms is higher than if made collectively. Most writing on
the subject assumes that social networks are formed by individual decisions that
trade off the cost of forming and maintaining links against the potential reward
[Goyal and Vega-Redondo 2000].
In Colombia, the forming of social networks is often motivated by a need to
obtain information that increases the probability of survival in a territory where
there are active armed factions. The links generated allow the transfer of
information about past experiences between individuals related by network
structures. It allows them to increase their stock of knowledge about the behaviour
of armed groups, and to reduce the error rate of individual decision making.
Before the network becomes active, each individual has a specific belief system
that represents his/her beliefs with respect to his/her neighbour’s beliefs, and in
turn with respect to the armed agent’s most probable course of action. When
two individuals form a network, their belief systems change. The degree of
change depends on the individual system of beliefs. In a network, individuals
must update their belief systems; thus all individuals will eventually share the
same system of beliefs.
Conclusion
In the context of an irregular war, individuals establish preferences in relation to
their current situation. A situation is defined by the economic opportunities
available and by the probability of survival associated with staying in a specific
territory at a time t. Territorial dispute leads to a decrease in the perceived
probability of survival, and individuals will decide not to stay in the disputed
territory, even if this decision implies incurring in increasing economic costs. They will
not maximise utility but try to improve their chances of survival, which is a form
of self-control. Networks are crucial to the convergence of individual decisions
with a minimum deliberation cost.
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